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Abstract
We study optimal ¯scal policy in a monetary union where monetary policy is decided
by an independent central bank. We consider a two-country model with trade in goods
and assets, augmented with sticky prices, labor income taxes and stochastic government
consumption. It is optimal to ¯nance a shock in part by running de¯cits and in part by
raising the labor income tax, even though the latter is distortionary. The optimal speed
of adjustment of budget de¯cits is much higher than the benchmark adjustment of 0.5
percent of GDP per year required by the recent revision of the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP). Optimal ¯scal policy does not depend on the initial level of public debt.
Ramsey monetary policy allows for less aggressive and more expansionary response of
¯scal policy than the monetary policy implied by an interest rates rule.
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21 Introduction
The creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe has put much emphasis
on the design of monetary and ¯scal institutions and on encouraging ¯scal discipline among
the member states. This has materialized in the Maastricht Treaty and its subsequent pacts
that forbid the European Central Bank (ECB) from purchasing member states' debts or
bailing them out, even in the event of a ¯scal crisis, and require it to pursue price stability.
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), in its original formulation, establishes that EMU
members should not run de¯cits in excess of 3 percent of GDP, except in deep recessions,
and that ¯scal policy should aim to bring the debt to GDP ratio to about 0.6 and balance
the budget over the business cycle after that. The rationale behind ¯scal limits in the EMU,
according to its proponents, was the fear of excessive de¯cits and pressure on the ECB with
untested reputation to monetize such de¯cits.
Repeated violations of the de¯cit limits stipulated by the SGP and di±culties in imple-
menting the established procedures for countries in violation of such limits led to a revision
of the SGP in 2005 aimed to increase its °exibility and to improve the implementability
of the pact. The increase in °exibility came with a broader de¯nition of \severe economic
downturn" to include prolonged period of low growth and with the introduction of relevant
factors, such as signi¯cant economic reforms, in the judgement used for triggering an ex-
cessive de¯cit procedure. The improved implementability took the form of country-speci¯c
medium-term objectives in cyclically adjusted terms and the introduction of a benchmark
adjustment of 0.5 percent of GDP per year for countries with de¯cits higher than their
medium-term objectives.
By now, the SGP regulates several dimensions of ¯scal policy, from the size of the de¯cit
to the speed of adjustment, the medium-term budget balances and the long-run public debt
level. An important component of an analysis of ¯scal policy and ¯scal limits is the fully
optimal ¯scal policy. This is the benchmark against which to compare actual policies and
¯scal limits should drive actual policies close to such benchmark.
This paper characterizes optimal ¯scal policy in a monetary union. This is the policy
that can be achieved by commitment by solving the Ramsey problem. We consider a two-
country model that trade in goods and assets augmented with sticky prices; both countries
belong to a monetary union and the common monetary policy is decided by an independent
central bank. Government spending as well as technology are stochastic and each government
decides ¯scal policy in its own country by setting the labor income tax and by deciding how
much public debt to issue.
We ¯nd that it is optimal to ¯nance a shock, for example an unanticipated increase
in government spending, in part by running a de¯cit and in part by raising income taxes.
There are two reasons why taxes are raised even if they are distortionary. First, the price
level cannot be raised instantaneously to in°ate public debt away because monetary policy
follows an interest rate rule that responds to in°ation. Second, even optimal monetary policy
would not in°ate public debt away completely because this would be costly in our setup with
sticky prices. As a result, optimal ¯scal policy entails an increase in the labor income tax
3and budget de¯cits that spread the tax increase over time.
The optimal unconditional net ¯nancial position of the ¯scal authority is a credit large
enough to ¯nance, with its interest income, steady-state government spending and labor sub-
sidies aimed at eliminating the distortion stemming from monopolistic competition. Condi-
tional on a given initial level of public debt, the optimal level of public debt is a random walk
in our model. In °exible price models, like in Chari et al. (1991), optimal monetary policy
in°ates any initial level of government debt away in the ¯rst period. This is not the case
in our setup because the central bank follows an interest rate rule. Even if monetary policy
is optimal, it does not in°ate the initial debt away in our model because the large increase
in the initial price level would persist over time in our setup, distorting relative prices and
consumption choices.
Optimal ¯scal policy is does not depend on the initial level of public debt. Ramsey ¯scal
policy commands the same response of public debt and taxes independently of the initial
debt level.1
Monetary and ¯scal policy interact in important ways. By changing the nominal interest
rate, the central bank a®ects the borrowing cost and therefore the extent to which optimal
¯scal policy relies on de¯cit versus tax ¯nancing. Interest rate rules that imply a more
aggressive increase of the nominal interest rate in response to a government spending shock
are associated with less persistent de¯cits. In response to a government spending shock, the
Ramsey planner reduces the nominal interest rate and the tax rate. This results in a strong
response of hours that raises output and makes the ¯scal shock expansionary in the short
run.
Optimal ¯scal policy in one country of the monetary union responds to shocks in other
countries of the union. There are a number of reasons for this result. First, we characterize
cooperative optimal ¯scal policy in the monetary union. Second, countries trade in goods
and assets. Third, monetary policy responds to union-wide variables so that a shock in one
country triggers an interest rate response by the common central bank.
2 Existing Literature
The existing literature studies the determination of optimal monetary and ¯scal policy when
the government problem is to ¯nance an exogenous stream of public consumption by levying
taxes and issuing debt and money so as to maximize welfare. Optimal monetary and ¯scal
policies depend on the environment in which they operate. When prices are °exible, com-
petition is perfect and government debt is state contingent, as in Lucas and Stokey (1983),
government debt and tax rates inherit the stochastic process of the exogenous shocks. When
government debt is nominally non-state-contingent, as in Chari et al. (1991), the government
¯nds it optimal to use in°ation as a lump-sum tax on ¯nancial wealth; as a result in°ation
is highly volatile while the tax rate remains stable over the business cycle. This result is
robust to the introduction of monopolistic competition in the goods market, as shown by
1As long as the initial debt level does not violate the transversality condition.
4Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004d).
Some papers have focused on studying optimal monetary policy in an environment with
nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition. Part of this literature assumes that the
government has access to lump-sum taxes to ¯nance its consumption and that it can im-
plement a production subsidy that eliminates the ine±ciency stemming from monopolistic
competition.2 As a result, the optimal in°ation rate is stable and close to zero. Intuitively,
lump-sum taxes are used to ¯nance government spending without creating distortions and
prices can remain stable to minimize the costs of in°ation in an environment with price
rigidities. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) depart from this literature by studying optimal
monetary and ¯scal policy in a model where the government can resort only to distortionary
income taxation and issue only nominal non-state-contingent bonds. Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe ¯nd that optimal in°ation volatility is almost zero even for low degrees of price sticki-
ness. Correia et al. (2003) enrich the set of ¯scal instruments and ¯nd that the set of frontier
implementable allocations does not depend on the degree of price stickiness.
We ¯nd that public debt and tax rates follow a random walk behavior in our model. This
result is consistent with the ¯ndings of Aiyagari et al. (2002) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004a), which assume like us that government debt is non-state contingent. Our work is
di®erent as it extends the analysis to an open economy with a monetary union.
A number of papers focus on the interaction of monetary and ¯scal policies. Dixit
and Lambertini (2003a) and Lambertini (2004) study the strategic interaction between a
conservative and independent central bank and a benevolent ¯scal authority that maximizes
social welfare in models where purpose of ¯scal policy is to stabilize prices and output. In
such setting, equilibrium outcomes are suboptimal when policies are discretionary and even
when monetary policy is committed but ¯scal policy is discretionary. The optimal design of
institutions assigns non-con°icting goals to the authorities and, if policies are discretionary,
the price goal should be appropriately conservative. Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003b)
extend this analysis to a monetary union and ¯nd that the spillover of one country's ¯scal
policy on others exacerbates the suboptimality of the equilibrium. Sibert (1992), Levine and
Brociner (1994) and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) consider monetary-¯scal interactions in
a monetary union where the purpose of ¯scal policy is to provide public goods. Chari and
Kehoe (2004) conclude that ¯scal limits are desirable in a monetary union when the central
bank cannot commit in advance. We depart from this literature in two ways. First, we
assume that government spending is exogenous and stochastic and that the problem faced
by the ¯scal authority is how to ¯nance such spending stream in the least disruptive way.
Second, we assume that the ¯scal authority can commit to its policies and the central bank
can commit to follow an interest rate rule. Third, the central bank and the ¯scal authority
have non-con°icting goals.
There is a large literature on the SGP, too large to be reviewed here. Eichengreen and
Wyplosz (1998) suggest that the SGP is likely to a®ect the ¯scal behavior of EMU members
2See Erceg et al. (2000), Gal¶ ³ and Monacelli (2000), Khan et a. (2000), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
and Woodford (2000, 2003).
5and to partly hamper automatic stabilizers,3 thereby wondering if the SGP will only be a
\minor nuisance". Beetsma and Debrun (2004, 2005) argue that ¯scal limits ¶ a la SGP help
reduce the de¯cit bias of electorally-motivated governments but also reduce spending on
\high-quality" outlays such as public investment and other outlays typically associated with
economic reforms. Wyplosz (2005, 2006) argue that the SGP is °awed, even though it has
in°uenced policymakers in the sense that ¯scal policy would have likely been less disciplined
than they have been. Nevertheless, ¯scal policy should follow the lead from monetary policy
and move from discretion to rules and then to institutions. This logical sequence has been
put into practice for monetary policy and it has worked remarkably well. We contribute to
this literature by providing a formal assessment of how often the SGP would bind if ¯scal
policy were optimal.
3 The Model
The model assumes two countries, country 1 and 2, that belong to a monetary union and
share a common currency. Each country has a separate government that run ¯scal policy
while monetary policy is decided by a common and independent central bank.
The representative household in country 1 has preferences de¯ned over per capita con-





s¡tU (C1;s ¡ b1C1;s¡1;N1;s) (1)
where 0 < ¯ < 1 is a discount factor and Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator





where N1;t(i) is the quantity of labor of type i supplied by the representative individual to
domestic ¯rms. It is assumed that each di®erentiated good uses a specialized labor input
in its production and the individual supplies labor input to all domestic ¯rms. Preferences
display internal habit formation measured by the parameter b1 2 [0;1).
There is a continuum of di®erentiated goods distributed over the interval [0;1]; a fraction
n of these goods is produced in country 1 while the fraction 1 ¡ n is produced in country 2.










where C1;t(i) is consumption of good i at time t and µ > 1 is the constant elasticity of
substitution among the individual goods. The representative household consumes all goods
3Gal¶ ³ and Perotti (2003), however, ¯nd no empirical evidence that the SGP has impaired ¯scal stabiliza-
tion.










which is the minimum cost of a unit of the aggregate consumption good de¯ned by (2), given
individual good prices Pt(i).
The representative household in country 2 has symmetric preferences to those in (1) and
(2). All households in country 1 begin with the same amount of ¯nancial assets and own
the same share of domestic ¯rms; ownership of foreign ¯rms is not allowed. The budget






























1;t is the purchase of a riskless, non-contingent nominal bond in real terms. This
bond is the only asset available for borrowing or lending between the two countries and
1 + it is the gross nominal interest rate. w1;t is the real wage in period t; in the absence of
¯rm-speci¯c technological shocks, all labor types receive the same wage because they have
the same marginal productivity. ¦1;t(i) are real pro¯ts of ¯rm producing good i in country
1. ¿1;t is a distortionary income tax levied by the government of country 1 at time t. The










on ¯nancial wealth, where qt;T is the stochastic discount factor. The household maximizes















¡UN(C1;t ¡ b1C1;t¡1;N1;t) = ¸1;tw1;t(1 ¡ ¿1;t); (9)
where UC;UN are the marginal utility with respect to consumption and labor, respectively
and ¸1;t is the lagrangean multiplier at time t on the agent's budget constraint. (6) shows
that the agent's consumption of each di®erentiated goods is negatively related to its relative
price. ¸1;t equals the marginal utility of consumption, as stated by (7). (8) is the standard
Euler equation and (9) represents the labor-leisure tradeo®.
7Goods are produced by ¯rms that make use only of labor:
Y1;t(i) = A1;tN1;t(i); (10)
where A1;t is an exogenous stochastic technological factor common to all ¯rms in country 1.
Country 2 has a similar production function. Firms maximize the present discounted value










Y1;t(i) ¡ w1;tN1;t(i): (12)







(Ct + Gt) (13)
where Ct ´ nC1;t + (1 ¡ n)C2;t is monetary union-wide private consumption and Gt ´
nG1;t + (1 ¡ n)G2;t is monetary union-wide public consumption.
Prices are sticky. Every period, a fraction Á 2 [0;1) of randomly chosen ¯rms does not
change price and meets demand at the posted price; the remaining fraction 1 ¡ Á of ¯rms
























where mc1;t is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the constraint that production


























where Yt = Ct + Gt is aggregate demand, which the ¯rm takes as given. The optimal price
depends on current and expected future marginal costs and demand conditions. Here we
limit our attention to a symmetric equilibrium where all ¯rms that can change their prices
8in a country choose the same price. Let ~ p1;t ´ ~ P1;t=Pt, where ~ Pt is the optimal price level
chosen at t by ¯rms in country 1. The dynamics of prices is
1 = Á¼
µ¡1









where ¼t ´ Pt=Pt¡1 is the in°ation rate in period t.
Because the model does not assume production subsidies to ensure that long-run output
levels are at their competitive levels, we wish to retain the non-linearity of (16) and use
second-order linear approximations to the equilibrium conditions for correct welfare evalua-





















































A common central bank decides monetary policy for the union and each country's govern-
ment decides ¯scal policy for its own country. The central bank is instrument-independent
in the sense that it chooses monetary policy freely and it does not share the government
budget constraints. The central bank follows the interest rate rule








+ Ái(it¡1 ¡¹ i); (21)
where ¹ i is the steady-state value of the nominal interest rate. (21) describes an interest
rate rule whereby the central bank sets the nominal rate as a function of the deviations
of monetary union-wide output and in°ation from their steady state values. It is typically
assumed that the coe±cient on in°ation Á¼ is greater than one, which implies that the central
bank raises the nominal interest rate in response to an increase in in°ation.
The ¯scal authority in each country decides how to ¯nance an exogenous and stochastic











and similarly for country 2. Cost minimization implies that the government demand for
good i has the same form as (6), the agent's demand for good i. The budget constraint for




















0;n(Pt(i)=Pt)¡µdi: After some simpli¯cations, these

































diYt = x1;tYt (26)










diYt ¡ w1;tN1;t = h1;tYt ¡ w1;tN1;t: (27)




+ (1 ¡ n)
A2;tN2;t
x2;t
= Yt = Ct + Gt; (28)









2;t) = 0; 8t: (29)
4 The Ramsey Problem
Consider now a benevolent planner that decides how to ¯nance an exogenously given stream
of public spending in the monetary union so as to maximize utility as given by a weighted
average of the two countries' utilities. Suppose the benevolent planner can commit ex-ante
to a sequence of policies. Let n1 = n;n2 = 1 ¡ n1. The lagrangean for the benevolent
planner's problem, which is known as the Ramsey problem, is given in (A.1) in appendix
A. The benevolent planner chooses the sequence of tax rates f¿sg associated with the
competitive equilibrium that yields the highest level of joint utility in the union. The Ramsey
policy functions associated to problem (A.1) form a dynamic system that cannot be solved
analytically. As suggested earlier, steady-state output is ine±ciently low in this model,
thereby violating the set of assumptions that allow welfare to be approximated accurately
from a ¯rst-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions. For this reason, we compute
second-order approximations to the policy functions using the computer code of Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004b).
105 Calibration
The time unit is a quarter and the period utility function is:
U (C1;t ¡ b1C1;t¡1;N1;t) = log(C1;t ¡ b1C1;t¡1) ¡ dlog(1 ¡ N1;t):
d is equal to 2, which implies that the representative agent works one third of her total
time in the steady state. The internal habit persistence stock is assumed to be 55% of past
consumption, which is in line with the estimates in Smets and Wouters (2002). The discount
factor ¯ is 0.99, which is consistent with a steady-state real rate of return of 4.1 percent a
year. Sbordone (2002) and Clarida et al. (1999) suggest that the parameter Á summarizing
the degree of price staggering is equal to 2/3 implying that ¯rms on average change prices
every three quarters; Bils and Klenow (2004) suggest instead a 4.3 months average lifespan
of prices. We follow Bils and Klenow and set the parameter Á equal to 1/3, which implies
an average life span of prices of 4.5 months. The steady-state gross in°ation rate is one.
The mark-up parameter µ is set equal to 11, so that steady-state mark-up is 10 percent,
as consistent with the work of Basu and Fernald (1997) and as used in other works that
assume price staggering (see for example Gal¶ ³ (2003)). For our benchmark speci¯cation, we
assume that the interest rate rule responds to in°ation and to the lagged nominal interest
rate by setting Á¼ = 1:5 and Ái = 0:9. Later on we consider alternative parameter values
along the lines of Smets and Wouters (2002) and Taylor (1993). The size of country 1
is set equal to 0.3, which is consistent with the size of Germany relative to the euro area.
Steady-state government consumption is assumed to be 20 percent of GDP in both countries,
which is consistent with data from post-war Germany and most members of the EMU. The
benchmark simulation features a government debt-to-GDP ratio of 0.6 both in country 1 and
2; private bond holding are assumed to be 0.6 of GDP in country 1 and 2. The steady-state
labor income tax rate that balances the government budget is 24% in country 1 and 20%
in country 2. Table 1 summarizes the values assigned to the structural parameters of the
model.
Government spending and technology are assumed to follow the stochastic processes
lnGi;t = (1 ¡ ½g)lnGi + ½g lnGi;t¡1 + ²
g
i;t; i = 1;2; (30)
lnAi;t = (1 ¡ ½a)lnAi + ½a lnAi;t¡1 + ²
a
i;t; i = 1;2: (31)
The persistence parameters and the standard deviation of the shocks are estimated using
data for Germany; their values are given in Table 1.
6 Ramsey Dynamics
With sticky prices and nominally non-state-contingent assets, the Ramsey problem contains
a sequence of intertemporal constraints, one for each date and state. This makes it impossible
to ¯nd an exact numerical solution to the Ramsey problem. This section presents the results
of our second-order approximation to the Ramsey's problem.4 Incidentally, a ¯rst-order
4We use the computer code developed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b).
11Parameter Value Description
¯ 0.99 Subjective discount factor
d 2 Calibrated to match N = 0:3
b 0.55 Internal habit
µ 11 Calibrated to match 1.1 gross value-added markup
Á 1/3 Degree of price stickiness
Áy 0 Coe±cient on output
Á¼ 1.5 Coe±cient on in°ation
Ái 0.9 Interest-rate smoothing
g=Y 0.2 Government consumption to GDP ratio
bg=Y 0.6 Government debt to GDP ratio
bp=Y 0.6 Private bond holding as % of GDP
n1 0.3 Country size
½g 0.88 Serial correlation of lngt
¾g 0.015 Standard deviation of innovation to lngt
½a 0.9 Serial correlation of lnat
¾a 0.02 Standard deviation of innovation to lnat
Table 1: Structural parameters
approximation to the Ramsey equilibrium conditions generates dynamics that are very close
to the dynamics associated with a second-order approximation in a closed economy with
characteristics similar to those of our model.5
Figure 1 shows the impulse response of some variables in country 1 to a one percentage
point increase in government purchases. It is optimal to ¯nance an increase in government
spending in part by raising labor income taxes and in part by running budget de¯cits.
Issuing public debt enables the Ramsey planner to keep a smooth tax pro¯le that spreads
the distortion over time and to soften the response of private consumption.
Taxes and real public debt display unit-root behavior, as de¯cits are not followed by
surpluses. In response to a one percentage point increase in government spending, real
public debt increases by 2 percentage points in the long run. As a consequences of higher
debt, the tax rate increases, hours fall and consumption falls at the new steady state.
In a monetary economy with °exible prices, a Ramsey planner that decides monetary
and ¯scal policy would set the price level equal to 1 in period 0 because this amounts to a
non distortionary wealth tax { see Lucas and Stokey (1983). If the initial price level is not
allowed to change but subsequent prices are fully °exible, Chari et al. (1991) show that the
Ramsey planner ¯nds it optimal to ¯nance an increase in government spending by raising
prices. As a result, in°ation is highly volatile and little persistent while the labor income tax
rate has low volatility and high persistence. Intuitively, the in°ation tax works as a lump-
sum tax on nominal wealth that is preferable to distortionary labor income tax. Neither of
5See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a).
























































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Impulse response to a government spending shock in country 1
13these results is present in our model. The Ramsey ¯scal planner knows that the interest rate
follows the rule (21) and chooses a set of ¯scal policies that are consistent with relatively
stable prices. Moreover, because price adjustment is not instantaneous in the economy, price
changes are persistent and price dispersion distorts production and consumption choices,
thereby reducing welfare.
The dynamic response of our macroeconomic variables are consistent with those found
in other studies that focus on monetary and ¯scal policy in sticky-price economies { see for
example Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004c). Gal¶ ³ et al. (2004) assume rule-of-thumb agents
that do not participate the asset market so that their consumption responds one-for-one
to changes in disposable income as in the Keynesian tradition. If the fraction of rule-of-
thumb agents is su±ciently large and the labor market non-competitive, the model delivers
a positive response of private consumption to a shock in government spending. Bilbiie at
al. (2005) ¯nd that the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers necessary to generate a positive
response of private consumption to a government spending shock in U.S. data has fallen
signi¯cantly.
Figure 2 depicts the impulse of a number of endogenous variables to a one percentage
point increase in the exogenous productivity factor A1 in country 1. In response to the
productivity shock, the real wage and hours worked increase in country 1. Private consump-
tion also responds positively. In°ation falls because goods produced in country 1 become
cheaper. The increased demand for goods raises the real wage in country 2 and reduces
hours worked there. The technological shock is expansionary at the moneteary-union level.
The nominal interest rate falls in response to the technological shock. While this result may
seem surprising, it is entirely due to the negative impact of the supply shock on in°ation.
As for ¯scal policy, the tax rate falls in response to the technological improvement and gives
additional incentive for an increase in hours worked. Notwithstanding the fall in the tax
rate, country 1 experiences budget surpluses that reduce real public debt in the long run.
7 Ramsey Fiscal Policy and the Debt Level
This section investigates how Ramsey ¯scal policy is a®ected the initial level of public debt.
Figure 3 shows the impulse response of the ¯scal variables to a government consumption
shock associated with steady-state debt levels ranging from 20 to 100 percent of GDP. In
our speci¯cation, the optimal response of real public debt is to increase by the same amount
independently of its initial level. Hence, real public debt grows more for lower initial debt
levels once the increase is expressed in percentage points.
Since the increase in the level of real public debt is the same, this means that all economies
must raise their tax revenues by the same amount in order to ¯nance the interest payment
on the increase of the debt. Hence, tax rates increase by the same amount and have the
same dynamics.
Ramsey ¯scal policy is therefore independent of the initial level of debt in our speci¯ca-
tion. In response to a government spending shock, real public debt increases by the same
amount independently of the initial debt level, which in turn requires an identical increase in

























































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Impulse response to a one percent technological shock in country 1






































































Figure 3: Impulse response to a one percentage point government consumption shock with
di®erent steady-state debt levels
tax rates that generates an identical increase in revenues to ¯nance higher interest payments.
8 Fiscal Cooperation
Ramsey cooperative ¯scal policy studies how ¯scal policy in country 1 and in country 2
should respond to a shock so as to maximize the joint utility in the monetary union, namely
the weighted average of the utility functions of the two representative citizens. We have
assumed the weight of each utility function to be equal to the relative size of the country.
Under Ramsey ¯scal cooperation, country 2's ¯scal policy responds to a shock in country
1 and vice versa. Figure 4 shows the impulse of variables in country 2 in response to a
one percentage point increase of government spending shock in country 1, namely the same
shock considered in Figure 1. The optimal ¯scal response in country 2 is to raise taxes and
run budget surpluses in the short run. Intuitively, the de¯cits of country 1 are matched
by surpluses in country 2. However, the short-run increase of the tax rate in country 2 is
about half the increase in country 1. Private consumption is crowded out on impact but it
raises above its steady-state value thereafter. Hours worked also increase in the short run in
response to the demand shock.
From the monetary union point of view it is optimal to match public de¯cits in country
1 to public surpluses in country 2 to avoid a large fall in bond prices that, in turn, would
require an even larger tax increase in country 1. The public surpluses in country 2 reduce
the net supply of bonds and help spreading the tax distortion over the monetary union.
There are two additional reasons why a shock in country 1 generates a ¯scal response
in country 2. One is the international transmission of shocks stemming from the fact that































































































































































































Figure 4: Impulse response in country 2 to a one percentage point government consumption
shock in country 1
the two countries trade extensively in goods and assets. The other reason is that monetary
policy responds to union-wide shocks. As a result, the international transmission of shocks
is important in our model, as it is the case in the EMU.
8.1 Ramsey Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Monetary and ¯scal policy interact in a number of ways. On one side, a short-run increase
in the nominal interest rate raises the cost of borrowing and depresses bond prices. The
Ramsey ¯scal planner will therefore rely more on raising taxes than on de¯cit ¯nancing of a
shock. On the other hand, an increase in the labor income tax rate is likely to have a negative
impact on hours worked and have in°ationary consequences that, in turn, will require an
increase of the nominal interest rate.
17This section characterizes optimal ¯scal and monetary policy. The Ramsey planner now
decides not only the labor income tax but also the nominal interest rate. Our goal is to
compare dynamics under Ramsey ¯scal and monetary policy with the dynamics under Ram-
sey ¯scal and rule-based monetary policy to understand how monetary and ¯scal policies
interact.
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of some macroeconomic variables under Ramsey
monetary and ¯scal policy and under Ramsey ¯scal policy and the interest rule (21) with
Á¼ = 1:5 and Ái = 0:9. Ramsey monetary policy reduces on impact the nominal interest rate
whereas rule-based monetary policy raises it. The Ramsey planner tolerates slightly higher
in°ation in order to bring a stronger expansionary response. By cutting the cost of issuing
bonds, the Ramsey planner can even cut taxes in the short run to bring out an even stronger
response of hours. As a result, the de¯cit is smaller under Ramsey monetary policy as well
as the fall in private consumption.
Other studies have analyzed the response to a government spending shock in a closed
economy and the impulse responses of ¯gure 1 are in line with them. In a closed economy
with a number of additional frictions, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) ¯nd a similar dynamic
response of the nominal interest rate and the tax rate, namely that they fall in impact, rise
and then fall again. As a result, they also ¯nd a positive response of hours, output and
in°ation and a negative response of private consumption under Ramsey monetary and ¯scal
policies. Interestingly, the initial negative response of the nominal interest rate and the labor
income tax rate is replaced by a positive one when Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe analyze simpler
policy rules that, in the case of monetary policy, resemble quite closely the Taylor-type rule
(21).
9 The Speed of Adjustment
The recent reform of the SGP requires EMU member countries that have yet not achieved
their medium-term objective for the budget de¯cit to undertake an annual adjustment of
at least 0.5 percent of GDP. Figure 9 compares the optimal speed of adjustment with the
mandated adjustment of the SGP. The lines in ¯gure 9 are the budget de¯cits as percent of
GDP under optimal ¯scal policy and under the assumption that the country adjusts at the
annual speed of 0.5 percent of GDP. The adjustment speed required by the SGP is lower than
the optimal one and it results in budget de¯cits consistently higher than those stemming
from Ramsey ¯scal policy for over six years.
10 Conclusions
We have studied optimal ¯scal policy in an economy with sticky prices that consists of two
countries belonging to a monetary union. The main ¯ndings of our work can be summarized
as follows. First, in response to a government spending shock, it is optimal to raise taxes
and run budget de¯cits in the country where the shock originates; the other country ¯nds















































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Impulse response to a one percentage point government consumption shock under
Ramsey and under rule-based monetary policy


















































Figure 6: Adjustment Speed under Optimal Fiscal Policy and the SGP
it optimal to also raise tax rates that lead to budget surpluses and an improved long run
equilibrium. Second, real public debt and taxes display random walk behavior. Following
a government shock, for example, the optimal ¯scal policy implies an increase in real debt
and therefore a worsening of the net asset position of the country. Third, the optimal ¯scal
policy does not change with the initial level of debt.
Ramsey monetary policy is less aggressive than monetary policy implied by an interest
rate rule. In response to a government spending shock, the interest rate increases when
monetary policy follows an interest rate rule. On the other hand, under Ramsey monetary
policy the nominal interest rate falls. This reduction of the cost of borrowing makes the
¯scal response smoother and more expansionary under Ramsey monetary policy.
Our work studies optimal ¯scal policy in a relatively simple setup with a representative
agent and with no utility stemming from public good provision. This simple setup is justi¯ed
by our focus on the stabilization part of ¯scal (and monetary) policy. Fiscal policy, however,
has other components we have abstracted from. Public spending on investment may improve
the productivity of factors of production and therefore boost economic activity in the future,
as argued by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). Households may care about public good
provision and, more importantly, they may care di®erently about di®erent public goods as
some may prefer spending on national defense over spending on environmental issues or
viceversa. Under this scenario, governments are partisan and electoral uncertainty biases
20¯scal policy away from optimality by making governments run excessive de¯cits. Beetsma
and Debrun (2004, 2005) argue that ¯scal limits ¶ a la SGP help reduce such de¯cit bias
but also reduce spending on \high-quality" outlays such as public investment and other
outlays typically associated with economic reforms. Future research should incorporate these
characteristics of ¯scal policy and emphasize the political-economy issues related to the
implementation of ¯scal policy rules.
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23Appendix
A The Ramsey Problem
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